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Abstract 
 
Despite the great effort that has been dedicated to the attempt to redefine 
expected utility theory on the grounds of new assumptions, modifying or 
moderating some axioms, none of the alternative theories propounded so far 
had a statistical confirmation over the full domain of applicability.  
Moreover, the discrepancy between prescriptions and behaviors is not limited 
to expected utility theory. In two other fundamental fields, probability and 
logic, substantial evidence shows that human activities deviate from the 
prescriptions of the theoretical models. 
The paper suggests that the discrepancy cannot be ascribed to an imperfect 
axiomatic description of  human choice, but to some more general features of 
human reasoning and assumes the “dual-process account of reasoning” as a 
promising explanatory key. This line of thought  is based on the distinction 
between the process of deliberate reasoning and that of intuition; where in a 
first approximation, “intuition” denotes a mental activity largely automatized 
and inaccessible from conscious mental activity. 
The analysis of the interactions between these two processes provides the 
basis for explaining the persistence of the gap between normative and 
behavioral patterns. This view will be explored in the following pages: central 
consideration will be given to the problem of the interactions between 
rationality and intuition, and the correlated “modularity” of the thought.  
 
 
 
1 Introduction: rationality and intuition 
 
 
Beginning with the work of Allais in the early 1950s, psychologists and economists have 
discovered a growing body of evidence on the discrepancy between the prescriptions of expected 
utility theory and real human behavior. The accumulated experimental evidence has reached a 
critical point in which a large number of economists share the sharp opinion expressed by Reinhardt 
Selten (1999): 
 
“Modern mainstream economic theory is largely based on an unrealistic picture of human decision 
making. Economic agents are portrayed as fully rational Bayesian maximizers of subjective utility.  
This view of economics is not based on empirical evidence, but rather on the simultaneous 
axiomization of utility and subjective probability. In the fundamental book of Savage the axioms 
are consistency requirements on actions with actions defined as mappings from states of the world 
to consequences (Savage 1954). One can only admire the imposing structure built by Savage. It has 
a strong intellectual appeal as a concept of ideal rationality. However, it is wrong to assume that 
human beings conform to this ideal.” 
                                                 
1I am very grateful to Laura Arrighi for her careful assistance in the preparation of this work. Correspondence 
concerning the present chapter should be addressed to Massimo Egidi, Luiss Guido Carli University, via Pola 12 - 
00198 Rome. e-mail: megidi@luiss.it.  
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Despite the great effort that has been dedicated to the attempt to redefine expected utility theory on 
the grounds of new assumptions, modifying or moderating certain axioms, none of the alternative 
theories propounded so far had a statistical confirmation over the full domain of applicability.  
Moreover, the discrepancy between prescriptions and behaviors is not limited to expected utility 
theory. In two other fundamental fields, probability and logic, substantial evidence shows that 
human activities deviate from the prescriptions of the theoretical models. 
Therefore one may suspect that the discrepancy cannot be ascribed to an imperfect theoretical 
description of  human choice, but to some more general features of human reasoning. Along this 
line, implicitly held by D. Kahnemann in his Nobel Lecture, one of the more innovative approach is 
the recent development of the dual-process account of reasoning. This line of thought  is based on 
the distinction between the process of deliberate reasoning and that of intuition; where in a first 
approximation, “intuition” denotes a mental activity largely automatized and inaccessible from 
conscious mental activity. 
The analysis of the interactions between these two processes provides the basis for explaining the 
persistence of the gap between normative and behavioral patterns: interestingly, this approach 
echoes the original view of Laplace and other mathematicians who paved the way for the theory of 
probability, insofar as they considered intuition as an internal psychical force deviating individual’s 
choices from pure rationality. 
This view will be explored in the following pages: central consideration will be given to the 
problem of the interactions between rationality and intuition, by describing the experimental and 
neurological basis of the interactions and reading this approach from the perspective of a cognitive 
approach to rationality. 
 
 
2 Historical roots 
2.1 Probability 
 
Historians usually consider a letter that Blaise Pascal wrote to Pierre Fermat in 1654 about a 
gambling problem as being the founding document of mathematical probability. The 
correspondence between Pascal and Fermat was exclusively devoted to gambling problems, and for 
a long period the most relevant probabilistic problems solved by mathematicians were of this sort.  
It is perhaps due to this fact that, since its early beginnings, the theory of probability was intended 
as a powerful tool to help players and gamblers see beyond the illusions, prejudices and emotions 
influencing their evaluations and to provide them with a “rational” strategy for gambling.  
Therefore, probability theory developed as a rational approach to risk and uncertainty, and the great 
mathematicians that gave fundamental contributions to this theory in the XVIII and XIX century 
implicitly assumed that their models should have allowed persons exposed to risky decisions to 
behave rationally. Interestingly, the efforts of mathematicians were only partially successful: 
 
“Some crusading spirits, Daniel Defoe among them, hoped that mathematicians might cure the 
reckless of their passions for cards and dice with a strong dose of calculation (Defoe 1719). The 
mathematicians preached the folly of such pursuit along with the moralists, but apparently most 
gamblers had little appetite for either sort of edification.”(Gingerenzer et al. 1989, p. 19) 
 
Despite the efforts of mathematicians, the progressive edification of the theory of probability did 
not remove some “irrationalities” in gamblers’ behavior: even today there are some typical lotteries’ 
conditions in which gamblers exhibit systematic discrepancies from the normative prescriptions of 
the theory. The best known phenomenon in this respect is now called “gambler’s fallacy”: when the 
sequence of numbers extracted in repetitive runs of a lottery appears to gamblers not to be random. 
In a random sequence of tosses of a fair coin, for example, gamblers expect sequences where the 
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proportion of heads and tails in any short segment stays far closer to .50 than probability theory 
would predict. In other words, gamblers also expect that a short sequence of heads on the toss of a 
coin will be balanced by a tendency for the opposite outcome (e.g., tails) and will bet accordingly. 
 
That some gamblers’ beliefs about probability are systematically biased becomes more and more 
evident in parallel with the progressive construction of the theory. Since his "Essai Philosophique 
sur les Probabilités" was published in 1796, Pierre Simon de Laplace was already concerned with 
errors of judgment to such a point that he included a chapter regarding “Des illusions dans 
l'estimation des probabilités”. It is here that we find the first published account of the gambler's 
fallacy. 
 
« Lorsqu'à la loterie de France un numéro n'est pas sorti depuis longtemps, la foule s'empresse de le 
couvrir de mises. Elle juge que le numéro resté longtemps sans sortir doit, au premier tirage, sortir 
de préférence aux autres. Une erreur aussi commune me parait tenir à une illusion par laquelle on se 
reporte involontairement à l'origine des événements. Il est, par exemple, très peu vraisemblable 
qu'au jeu de croix ou pile on amènera croix dix fois de suite. Cette invraisemblance qui nous frappe 
encore, lorsqu'il est arrivé neuf fois, nous porte à croire qu'au dixième coup pile arrivera. Cependant 
le passé, en indiquant dans la pièce une plus grande pente que pour pile, rend le premier dé ces 
événements plus probable que l'autre; il augmente, comme on 1'a vu, la probabilité d’amener croix 
au coup suivant. » (Laplace 1814, introduction, CXIII) 2 
 
The idea that humans had to learn to “calculate” their probabilities to make the right decision and 
that pure rationality might be “deviated” by emotion and intuition permeated the whole XIX 
century. Laplace maintains that the introduction of probability theory may help individuals to 
rationally correct the illusions generated by the “sensorium”(in today’s terms the cognitive system); 
according to Laplace, the brain’s processing of perceptions leads to an internal representation of 
reality that can be misleading. While admitting that his analysis of the role of perception, 
memorization, attention and other psychological elements, is largely “imperfect” - the state of 
psychology at that time - Laplace gives many vivid illustrations of the fact that psychological 
processes may produce biased evaluations. (Laplace 1814, introduction CXII, CXV) This point has 
been re-evocated in recent literature on cognitive psychology and neuro-economics, which we will 
consider later  (Camerer, Loewenstein, Prelec, 2004), limiting the discussion to a particular kind of 
potential sources of biases, the “illusions” of Laplace’s analysis.  
 
 
2.2 Logic 
 
Deviations from the logically correct reasoning, or “fallacies”, have been widely analyzed since the 
XII Century; with the translation into Latin of De Sophisticis Elenchis  (the last part of Aristotle’s 
Organon) many scholars attempted to detect, describe, classify and analyze fallacious arguments. 
According to Hamblin,3 “A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle onwards 
tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so”; how can it be that a wrong argument seems to 
be valid? As the studies in psychology of reasoning have shown, this discrepancy comes from the 
imperfect control by the human mind over the reasoning process: on the one hand errors may be 
inadvertently generated by individuals while developing the thinking process, on the other hand, 
hidden errors in a reasoning are detected with great difficulty. Playing on this difficulty, errors may 
also be consciously generated by one of the two opponents in a litigation to take advantage over the 
other party. As a matter of fact, a substantial motivation for identifying and classifying fallacies in 
                                                 
2 Gamblers’ fallacies have been carefully explored in recent times; see, among others, Tversky and Kahneman (1971) 
Roger (1998), Clotfelter and  Cook (1993), Ayton and Fisher (2004)  
3 Hamblin (1970), p. 12   
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the Middle Ages was to avoid this eventuality and achieve fair conduct of the parties involved in a  
dialectic discussion, i.e. a discussion at the beginning of which it is unclear where the truth is.  
With a semantic shift from faulty to unfair, “dialectic” is nowadays meant as a potentially 
malicious reasoning, artificially created to persuade those listening; in medieval thought, the word 
dialectic was not necessarily labelled as negative: the existence of conflicting opinions was 
implicitly recognized as an intrinsic, unavoidable element of human reason. In the case of juridical 
questions the dialectic disputations were strictly regulated (Stump, 1989, Errera, 2006) and the 
classification of fallacies was therefore important to distinguish between valid reasoning and hidden 
(malicious or not) errors (Benzi, 2002). (See also the Appendix). 
The distinction between logic and psychology of human reasoning grew increasingly clear, and in 
XVII century,  
“Bacon said psychological and cultural factors – which he used to call “idols” - to be sources of 
errors in reasoning, as they generate distortions in human understanding. That view permeated the 
XVII century philosophical elaboration (see Locke, Cartesius, Arnauld and Nicolle, who co-
authored the Port-Royal Logic), which considered psychology – not logic – to be the discipline 
dealing with errors […].  
A turning point, that can be traced to Gottlob Frege and dates back to the end of the XIX century, 
was anti-psychologism in logic; this thesis draws a sharp distinction – which is typical in the 
prevalent contemporary view – between the roles of logic and psychology: logic should be 
conceived as the science of judgment, studying principles which allow one to assess and understand 
good, correct, valid reasoning and to distinguish it from its opposite; other disciplines - and 
especially psychology, but also ethnology and perhaps also other kinds of cultural analysis – are 
conceived as sciences studying the human reasoning processes, or people’s mental processes. 
(Benzi, 2005, p.1). 
 
 
2.3 Decision making 
 
 A similar “anti-psychologistic” movement marked the evolution of the theory of rational decision 
making. Also in this field, the discrepancies between normative prescriptions and behavior were 
well known since the beginning but were considered a minor problem. In 1952, Friedman and 
Savage published a famous study in which they constructed an expected utility curve which, they 
claimed, provided a reasonably accurate representation of human behavior at the aggregate level. In 
this paper they consider the individual’s expression of preferences as irrelevant and consequently 
not to be submitted to empirical control; deviations from rational decision making were supposed to 
be detectable only at the aggregate level, and many attempts were made to justify the persuasion 
that, on average, individuals behave rationally; in particular, Friedman suggested an evolutionary 
defense of full rationality by claiming that those who failed to conform to rational behavior would 
be gradually excluded by market selection . Therefore, according to this view, the psychological 
aspects of decision making were not considered worthy of investigation, because non-rational 
behaviors were thought to be a minor aspect of market economies.  
 The most serious challenge to this belief emerged with Allais’ experiments. In 1953 Maurice Allais 
carried out experiments on individual preferences that showed systematic deviations from 
theoretical predictions. Drawing on his critical paper a growing body of evidence has revealed that 
individuals do not necessarily conform to the predictions of the theory of decision making but seem 
to depart from them systematically. The literature devoted to this issue, nowadays called the 
“heuristic and bias program” after the pioneering studies by Kahneman and Tversky, is incredibly 
vast; biases and deviations from the theoretical predictions have been tested by an enormous 
number of independent researchers and well confirmed “effects”, like “preference reversal”, 
“conjunction fallacy”, “framing effect”, and many others have been detected.  
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The XIX century view that considered logic and probability as theories representing the “laws” of 
human thought has therefore been severely challenged by experiments, and to a certain extent has 
been superseded by the clear-cut distinction between the normative and the behavioral.  
This view seems to fit heuristic and bias program, because it holds a clear-cut differentiation 
between norms (rationality) and behaviors (reasoning). However, it opens a new problem: if there 
are important and systematic discrepancies between norms and behaviors, is it still realistic to aspire 
to predict human behavior?  
If we do not accept that the gap between behavior and normative prescriptions indicates systematic 
human irrationality, a new, more accurate and sophisticated explanation of rational behavior can be 
provided. Scholars in the field of expected utility theory have followed two different paths: on the 
one hand, they have tried to modify some of the axioms of the theory in order to find predictions 
closer to real behaviors; on the other hand, they made a systematic attempt to respond to this critical 
problem by redefining the foundations of decision making via a deeper exploration into the nature 
of human intelligence; the latter method implies rethinking the relations between economics and 
psychology, along the lines initiated by H. Simon with his “bounded rationality” approach. (Simon, 
1971). The road for a deeper exploration of psychological foundations of human thought has also 
been followed also in the fields of logic and probability, whereas very few attempts have been made 
to modify the axioms of these two theories in order to predict the real behavior of individuals.4  
Since most evidence of the discrepancies occur within the framework of decision making and, more 
precisely, of expected utility theory, we will start from the phenomena which emerged in this field. 
 
 
3 The separation between psychology and economics  
 
Since its first appearance, the notion of utility has been grounded in the psychological features of 
human choice. As reminded by Schumpeter in his History of Economic Analysis,  
“In principle utility was considered a psychic reality, a sensation that became evident from 
introspection, independent of any external observation […] with directly measurable proportions. I 
believe this was Menger and Böhm-Bawerk’s opinion”. 
The effort of economists consisted in building up a formal model – the utility theory – of human 
decisions, descriptively valid, to be used as the building block of the new emerging “neoclassical” 
theory of economic decision.  
The separation of economics from psychology emerged only after heated debate in the first decades 
of XX century, with the full development of the theory of rational decision, that became 
progressively considered the core of the entire economic theory. A classic exposition of the theory 
is contained in the “Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economics” (1932) by Lionel Robbins, 
in which the author defines economics as the science of choice. According to this approach, 
‘calculation’ is totally independent from individual psychological processes, and it takes place 
irrespective of the mental processes of individuals. The role of rational decision making theory is 
viewed as being fundamentally normative; such a view was shared by the vast majority of 
economists for about a century, basing on the assumptions and the definitions provided by Robbins. 
He codified the idea that economics and psychology were indeed autonomous disciplines, with 
independent scientific statutes.  
 
The completion of the theory was achieved through the publication of “Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior” by von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944, in which the notion of expected 
utility was incorporated into the theory of choice. The original approach to decision making under 
risky conditions can be traced to a famous paper of 1738 by which Daniel Bernoulli introduced the 
idea of expected utility (see also Laplace, introduction, XX, XXV). 
                                                 
4 In his article “Wason’s Cards: What Is Wrong?”, Pei Wang has given an explanation of the phenomenon in terms of 
his non Aristotelian NARS inference system. 
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Prior to this paper, the rule suggested by mathematicians in order to provide a rational prescription 
for gamblers was to compare expected gains with expected losses, and claimed (later) by Laplace: 
  
«Dans une série d'événements probables, dont les uns produisent un bien et les autres une perte, on 
aura l'avantage qui en résulte, en faisant une somme des produits de la probabilité de chaque 
événement favorable par le bien qu’il procure,- et en retranchant de-cette somme celle des produits 
de la probabilité de chaque événement défavorable par la perte qui y est attachée. Si la seconde 
somme l'emporte sur la première, le bénéfice devient perte, et l'espérance se change en crainte. » 
(Laplace, introduction XIX). 
  
This view implicitly considers the balance between gains and losses (weighted by probabilities), i.e. 
the “expected value” of the prospect as the leading element to take a rational decision.  
In the same period, Bernoulli propounded a more sophisticated means of analyzing how a gambler 
may have taken a rational decision. To solve a chance game devised by his cousin Nicholas in 1713, 
known as the St. Petersburg paradox, Daniel Bernoulli suggested that the more a person is wealthy 
the less “useful” he considers increments in income, so that a gain would increase utility less than a 
loss of the same magnitude would reduce it. As regards a person with such an attitude to risk, it can 
be easily proved that the utility of the expected value of a fair gamble is lower than the utility of not 
playing; a gambler that behaves in this way is classified as “risk adverse”, because he prefers a 
certain given outcome to an uncertain outcome of the same expected value; the opposite behavior is 
called “risk proclivity”.    
Bernoulli’s idea implicitly assumes that in order to predict a gambler’s behavior we should compare 
the expected utility from engaging in the gamble to the expected utility from refusing to play. That 
suggests that we can compute the utility of a risky prospect as the sum of the utilities of the gains 
and losses weighed by the probabilities. This is in fact the notion of expected utility, explicitly 
suggested by von Neumann and Morgenstern in” Theory of Games and Economic Behavior” about 
two centuries after Bernoulli’s work. With the publication of the “Theory of Games” in 1944, the 
formal incorporation of risk into economic theory opened the door to important applications to 
game theory and other relevant fields.  
After von Neumann and Morgenstern’s book, the notion of expected utility entered a vast number 
of applied fields in economics, notwithstanding the scarce attention devoted by scholars to the 
empirical aspects: one well known example is a paper by Friedman and Savage published in 1948.  
Here the authors try to construct an expected utility curve that is supposed to represent the 
individual average behavior in the face of risky choices reasonably well. They combine two basic 
characteristics of the everyday (average) behavior of individuals: on the one hand, the fact that a 
large number of individuals risk small sums taking part in lotteries, i.e. are risk takers; on the other 
hand, the fact that those same individuals usually insure themselves, which means that are risk 
adverse. The first property requires a convex utility function, while the second requires a concave 
function. To take both these features of people’s behavior into account, Friedman and Savage 
(1952) suggest that the expected utility curve must have an “S” shape. Nevertheless, Friedman 
constructs a general shape of the curve without testing the two characteristics on a real population. 
In fact, precise data on insurance were not taken into consideration and reliable data relating to the 
income of gamblers do not even exist. Therefore, despite the great potentialities and the vast 
number of important applications, a sound testing of the expected utility assumptions was missing 
until a paper by Maurice Allais was published in 1952. 
At a symposium held in Paris, he presented two studies in which he criticized the descriptive and 
predictive power of the choice theory upheld by the “American school” and by Friedman in 
particular (Allais, 1953). He exposed experiments in which subjects faced with alternative choices 
under conditions of risk systematically violated the assumptions of the expected utility theory. 
Violations like the one discovered by Allais imply inconsistency in the choices of individuals: the 
question is such violations are systematic or not: in fact, rationality does not mean that the behavior 
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of individuals fits perfectly normative prescriptions of the expected utility theory; it means that 
individuals do not systematically deviate from normative prescriptions; that is perhaps why the 
initial reaction to Allais’ experimental result was lukewarm: at the beginning the experiments were 
thought to reflect extreme cases rather than systematic deviations from rational behavior, caused by 
the particularly large sums at stake; the experimental result did not have much impact for a while 
and its recognition was categorized under the label of “Allais paradox” for many years; it was only 
years later, after repeated experiments with players to whom modest sums were conceded, that the 
phenomenon emerged once again and its systematic nature was finally recognized.  
Since experiments showed a violation of the axioms, it was natural to suspect that this violation 
resulted from stringent characteristics imposed by the definition of the expected utility function. 
The reactions to Allais’s experiments led in fact to the creation of more sophisticated versions of the 
utility theory in conditions of uncertainty, modifying or moderating certain axioms or generalizing 
their characteristics. Many such proposals arose, especially from the mid 70s onwards, all of which 
were based on the attempt to relax or slightly modify the original axioms of expected utility theory. 
Among the best known are perhaps the Weighted Utility Theory (Chew and MacCrimmon1979), 
that assumes a weaker form of the axiom of independence; the Rank Dependent Model (Quiggin, 
1993) and the Disappointment Theory, suggested by Gul (1991). Again, the approach propounded 
by Mark Machina (1982) redefines the theory without resorting to the independence axiom. Finally, 
the Regret Theory proposed by Loomes and Sugden (1982) has received careful attention. None of 
these proposals had a statistical confirmation over the full domain of applicability. A 
comprehensive classification of the different alternatives is provided by Camerer (1995). 
Therefore this response to Allais’ criticism did not prove successful (or at least not thus far). Only 
gradually economists came to recognize the complex consequences of the systematic discrepancies 
between the predictions of expected utility theory and economic behavior; this opened an 
“embarassing” and still unsolved question: how to model in a more realistic way human behavior in 
economics. 
An alternative approach to the question was opened – in the same period as Allais’ experiments - by 
the idea of “bounded rationality” advanced by Simon, who explored the limits of rationality and 
began to shed light on the decision mechanisms by investigating the cognitive processes involved. 
Modifications of the axioms of the expected utility theory seemed to him and to many other 
scholars unfit to hold out the prospect of a future overall theory of decision-making: the alternative 
root was the complexity of the underlying psychological phenomena.  
 
 
4 Bounded rationality: a new road map 
 
 
The research conducted by Kahneman and Tversky was directed to make crucial reference to the 
mental processes involved. Their approach coherently fits within the analytical frame of Simon’s 
Bounded Rationality, as the two authors explicitly acknowledge.  Moving beyond Allais’ 
experiments, they made clear that under risky decisions, individuals show a systematic 
inconsistency related to the framing of the decision. Among an incredibly vast number of important 
families of biases they have discovered, the most celebrated is the so-called framing effect, in which 
individuals exhibit propensity to risk when a choice is presented in terms of loss, while they show 
aversion to risk if the same problem is presented in terms of gain. 
The proposal that Kahneman and Tversky advance to explain the results of the experiments is 
twofold: on the one hand, they advance the “prospect theory”, which assumes a strong 
inconsistency in individuals’ behavior, on the other, they pave the way for a new explanation of 
biases based on a dualistic approach to reasoning. Prospect theory is analyzed by Giraud in the 
present volume; therefore we will consider this first strand first and than the second in more detail. 
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The framing effect can be interpreted as saying that we perceive outcomes as gains and losses  
relative to a reference point; this target point usually corresponds to the current asset position, but 
might also be an aspired wealth position.  The representation in terms of losses and gains relative to 
a reference point is crucial, because the risk-taking attitude of individuals proves to be different 
above versus below the reference point. More precisely, in the prospect theory, the subjective value 
of an edited prospect is assumed to be convex for losses and concave for gains (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979).  
The introduction of the idea of a reference point is in accordance with a widespread phenomenon 
characterizing perception: the perception is reference-dependent, i.e. the attributes of a stimulus 
reflects the contrast between that stimulus and a context of prior and concurrent stimuli. By 
transferring this basic property of perception to the field of choice, Kahneman claims that Bernoulli 
was wrong, because he assumed the attitude to risk to be reference-independent.  
 
“The facts of perceptual adaptation were in our minds when Tversky and I began our joint research 
on decision making under risk. Guided by the analogy of perception, we expected the evaluation of 
decision outcomes to be reference-dependent. We noted, however, that reference-dependence is 
incompatible with the standard interpretation of Expected Utility Theory, the prevailing theoretical 
model in this area. [….] The idea that decision makers evaluate outcomes by the utility of final asset 
positions has been retained in economic analyses for almost 300 years. This is rather remarkable, 
because the idea is easily shown to be wrong; I call it Bernoulli’s error. 
Bernoulli’s model is flawed because it is reference-independent: it assumes that the value that is 
assigned to a given state of wealth does not vary with the decision maker’s initial state of wealth. 
This assumption flies against a basic principle of perception, where the effective stimulus is not the 
new level of stimulation, but the difference between it and the existing adaptation level. The 
analogy to perception suggests that the carriers of utility are likely to be gains and losses rather than 
states of wealth, and this suggestion is amply supported by the evidence of both experimental and 
observational studies of choice” (Kahneman, 2002). 
 
The key aspect emerging from the framing effect is that individuals give different answers to 
isomorphic problems, i.e. they evaluate differently two representations of the same problem. 
Kahneman suggests that framing must be considered a special case of the more general 
phenomenon of dependency from the representation: the question is how to explain the fact that 
different representations of the same problem yield different human decisions. While the notion of 
“representation” has received a deep treatment in Artificial Intelligence literature and in cognitive 
psychology, where it has been put in relation with the notions of abstraction and categorization 
(Giunchiglia, Villafiorita, Walsh, 1997), there is still a lack of experimental works on these issues. 
We owe the first studies in this field to Simon and Hayes (1976): they have explored the 
“representation” problem by constructing a collection of transformation puzzles, all formally 
identical to the tower of Hanoi problem, and found that ‘problem isomorphs’ varied greatly in 
difficulty. The authors note that “It would be possible for a subject to seek that representation which 
is simplest, according to some criterion, or to translate all such problems into the same, canonical, 
representation...”  (Simon & Hayes, 1976, p 183) but subjects will adopt the representation that 
constitutes the most straightforward translation of the original description of the puzzle. 
 “There is also a piece of evidence […] that a subject may abandon a difficult representation for one 
that makes solving the problem easier” (Simon & Hayes, 1976, p 190). 
 
There is evidence in many other problem solving tasks that, to reduce the mental load, individuals 
will try to simplify the problem’s representation. This implies that they try to use prior knowledge 
to re-codify in a simpler way a given problem. Therefore the process of recalling the memorized 
knowledge is a crucial aspect of problem representation and may be an important source of bias; in 
fact accessibility, i.e. the ease with which a memorized element comes to the mind (Higgins,1996) 
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is not guided by a controlled process; there is not a mechanical “data mining” process, a mechanical 
introspection with which individuals could decide which memorized element to recall to conscious 
attention and which not. Therefore 
 
“Invariance cannot be achieved by a finite mind. The impossibility of invariance raises significant 
doubts about the descriptive realism of rational-choice models (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). In the 
absence of a system that reliably generates appropriate canonical representations, intuitive decisions 
will be shaped by the factors that determine the accessibility of different features of the situation. 
Highly accessible features will influence decisions, while features of low accessibility will be 
largely ignored. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that the most accessible features are 
also the most relevant to a good decision.” (Kahneman, 2002). 
 
 
5 The dual approach to reasoning 
 
As hinted above, the framing effect may be considered as a particular case of the more general 
phenomenon of dependency from representation: different representations of the same problem may 
lead individuals to different answers to the same problem. How can we explain this phenomenon?  
There are two main answers in the literature: on the one hand, the claim that representation governs 
accessibility: the relevance of an element is induced by the features of representation. This means 
that, to some extent, a representation (a frame) leads us to (unconsciously) recall from long-term 
memory items that are relevant to the solution of a given task. As a consequence, precodified 
knowledge may be filtering and distorting the path to achieve a solution and may induce individuals 
to inadvertently commit errors. 
A second line which will be illustrated in section 6, claims that a large number of mental processes 
are governed by special-purpose systems—often called 'modules' dedicated to solving domain-
specific problems; following this view, different representations of the same problem may trigger 
different reactions because are processed by different domain specific modules.  
To fully understand these lines of research, we must resort to the dual model of thinking, an 
approach common to most psychologists in the present day. The dual view is based on the wide 
evidence that a large part of neural activity is related to ‘automatic’ processes, which are faster than 
conscious deliberations and which occur with little or no awareness of effort. 
Thinking is supposed to be composed of two different cognitive processes: on the one hand a 
controlled, deliberate, sequential and effortful process of calculation; on the other a non-deliberate 
process, which is automatic, effortless, parallel and fast. The two processes have been described in 
many different ways, by different authors, but there is considerable agreement nowadays among 
psychologists on the characteristics that distinguish them.  
The distinction was raised by Posner and Synder (1975) by wondering what level of conscious 
control individuals have over their judgements and decisions; among other authors who considered 
this question, Schneider and Shiffrin (1977) defined the two processes respectively as “automatic” 
and “controlled”; since then, many analogous two-system models have been developed under 
different names, as discussed by Camerer (2004). Stanovich and West (2000), call them 
respectively System 1 and System 2.5 
The question is also addressed by Kahneman in his Nobel Lecture, where he calls the two modes of 
thinking respectively intuition (automatic) and reasoning (controlled) (see Fig.1) 
 
Fig.1 
                                                 
5 The dualistic approach to cognition boasts a very rich literature; among the contributions relevant to the present 
discussion, see Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M.(1994) ,Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996), Chartrand, T. L., 
Bargh, J. A. (1996),(1999), Chen, M., Bargh, J. A. (1997), (1999), Bargh, J. A., Chartrand, T. L. (1999), Bargh J. A., 
Ferguson M.J. (2000),  Evans (2003).  
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Kahneman emphasizes the strong similarities between perception and intuition, both being 
automatic and difficult to control, and the consequent similarities between biases in perceptions and 
biases in intuitive judgments. Biases in perceptions are reference-dependent: as Fig. 2 shows, 
people consider the three individuals walking along a pathway to be of different size, whereas in 
fact they are identical: the reference is “disturbing” the evaluation of the size of the individuals, and 
this bias is automatic. Very few people see the three individuals as identical, but everybody will 
recognize this by turning the figure upside down.  
 
 
Fig. 2 
 
 
 
 
“From its earliest days, the research that Tversky and I conducted was guided by the idea that 
intuitive judgments occupy a position – perhaps corresponding to evolutionary history – between 
the automatic operations of perception and the deliberate operations of reasoning. Our first joint 
article examined systematic errors in the casual statistical judgments of statistically sophisticated 
researchers (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). Remarkably, the intuitive judgments of these experts did 
not conform to statistical principles with which they were thoroughly familiar.”  
 
It has been argued that brain activities corresponding to automatic and controlled processes develop 
in distinguishable areas. Patients with lesions in the prefrontal cortex have difficulties with decision 
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making and problem solving in ill-structured situations, particularly problem types involving 
planning and look-ahead components. Controlled processes seem to correspond to neural 
activations mainly in the orbital and prefrontal parts of the brain. (Goel, V., Grafman, J.,1995, 
2000), (Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert and Trope, 2002).  
“The prefrontal cortex is sometimes called the "executive" region, because it draws inputs from 
almost all other regions, integrates them to form near and long-term goals, and plans actions that 
take these goals into account (Shallice and Burgess, 1998). Regions that support cognitive 
automatic activity are concentrated in the occipital, parietal and temporal parts of the brain. The 
amygdala, buried below the cortex, is responsible for many important automatic affective 
responses, especially fear.” (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005) 
 
The intuitive process, which automatically elicits prior knowledge, is therefore considered as a 
basic source of  errors in reasoning; many experiments show that the cognitive self-monitoring, i.e. 
the control of the deliberate system over the automatic one, is quite light and allows automatic 
thought to emerge almost without control. According to Kahneman, errors in intuitive judgments 
involve failures in both systems: the automatic system, that generates the error, and the deliberate 
one, which fails to detect and correct it (1982). Along this line, Camerer et al. (2005) hold that 
because the person has little or no introspective control over the automatic system, intuitive 
judgments are not the outcome of a fully deliberate process, and do not conform to normative 
axioms of inference and choice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
6  Automatic reasoning and modularity 
 
 
According to Schneider and Shiffrin, automatic processing is activation of a learned sequence of 
elements in long-term memory that is initiated by appropriate inputs and then proceeds 
automatically without subject control, without stressing the capacity limitations of the system, and 
without necessarily demanding attention. It may happen that the sequences are the outcome of a 
perfectly rational reasoning, like for example rational strategies to solve simple problems. Their 
memorization in long-term memory leads to an automatic retrieval and use, in contexts that are not 
necessarily identical to the situations in which they originated.  
The experimental data available on puzzle solving, for example, show that most individuals, once 
they have been able to identify one strategy and use it repetitively until it becomes familiar, do not 
abandon it even in new contexts where better strategies are available.  
This tendency has been proved by Luchins (1942) and Luchins and Luchins (1950) who conducted 
experiments with subjects exposed to mathematical problems that had solutions at different levels 
of efficiency. The authors show that subjects, having identified a simple solution of a task in a given 
context, may “automatically” and systematically use such a solution applying it also to contexts 
where it proves to be sub-optimal. This process is called “mechanization of thought”.  
They used water jar problems where participants had three jars of varying sizes and an unlimited 
water supply and were asked to obtain a required amount of water (Fig. 3). Everyone received a 
practice problem. People in the experimental group then received five problems (problems 2-6) 
prior to critical test problems (7, 8, 10, and 11). People in the control group went straight from the 
practice problems to problems 7-11. Problems 2-6 were designed to establish a "set" (Einstellung) 
for solving the problems in a particular manner (using containers b-a-2c as a solution). People in the 
experimental group were highly likely to use the Einstellung Solution on the critical problems even 
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though more efficient procedures were available. In contrast, people in the control group used 
solutions that were much more direct. 
 
Fig. 3 
 
Problem  Given Jars of the Following Sizes  Obtain the 
Amount 
   A  B  C  
1   29  3    20 
2 Einstellung 1 21  127  3  100 
3 Einstellung 2 14  163  25  99 
4 Einstellung 3 18  43  10  5 
5 Einstellung 4 9  42  6  21 
6 Einstellung 5 20  59  4  31 
7 Critical 1  23  49  3  20 
8 Critical 2  15  39  3  18 
9   28  76  3  25 
10 Critical 3  18  48  4  22 
11 Critical 4  14  36  8  6 
 
 
Possible Answers for Critical Problems (7, 8, 10, 11) 
 
Problem Einstellung Solution  Direct Solution 
7 49 — 23 — 3 — 3 = 20 23 — 3 = 20 
8 39 — 15 — 3 — 3 = 18 15 + 3 = 18 
10 48 — 18 — 4 — 4 = 22 18 + 4 = 22 
11 36 — 14 — 8 — 8 = 6 14 — 8 = 6 
 
 
As seen above, Luchins and Luchins show that when subjects have identified the best solution of a 
task in a given context, they automatically transfer it to contexts where it is sub-optimal.  The 
experiments demonstrate that, once a mental computation deliberately performed to solve a given 
problem has been repeatedly applied to solve analogous problems, it may become “mechanized”. 
Mechanization enables individuals to pass from deliberate effortful mental activity to partially 
automatic, unconscious and effortless mental operations.  
Therefore, the experiments by Luchins and Luchins fully match the distinction between controlled 
and automatic processes: they show how a process of controlled reasoning – typically composed of 
slow, serial and effortful mental operations – comes to be substituted by an effortless process of 
automatic thinking. The sequences, once memorized, can be considered as the building blocks of 
the intuitive process.  
Luchins’ experiments allow us to provide evidence that elementary cognitive skills may be stored in 
memory as automatic routines, or programs that are triggered by a pattern matching mechanism 
and are executed without requiring mental effort or explicit thought. In some contexts these 
specialized skills, automatically activated, have been called specialized modules. 
It is important to note that this notion of specialized modules neither coincides with the notion of 
modules as innate mental devices proposed by Fodor (1983), nor does it fit the definition proposed 
by evolutionary psychologists who argue that mental modules are pervasive and the products of 
natural selection (Cosmides and Tooby,1992).  
Luchins’ experiments show how the process of acquisition of specialized modules - intended as  
automatic decision-action sequences - takes place; they form gradually, as a result of repeated 
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experience, and constitute specialized skills that, if applied to the original  problem, give rise to an 
effortless response; the setting up of specialized skills is the explanation for experts being able to 
elaborate strategies for solving problems more efficiently than novices. 
The essential role of specialized modules is testified by the experiments with chess players. An 
approximate estimate of chess grandmasters’ capacity to store different possible board setups in 
memory is around 10000 positions. Gobet and Simon (1996) tested memory for configurations of 
chess pieces positioned on a chess board, showing that superiority of experts over novices in 
recalling meaningful material from their domain of expertise vanishes when random material is 
used. They found that expert chess players were able to store the positions of players almost 
instantly, but only if they were in positions corresponding to a plausible game. For randomly 
arranged chess pieces, the experts were not much better than novices. Importantly, not only were 
experts able to recognize the boards, but to react instantly and automatically. Therefore, both the 
requirements - domain specificity and automatic activation – for specialized modules to be activated 
were satisfied in chess competitions; as we will see later, the automatic activation of specialized 
modules is a potential cause for biases.  
As Kahneman (2002) notes, “The acquisition of skills gradually increases the accessibility of useful 
responses and of productive ways to organize information, until skilled performance becomes 
almost effortless. This effect of practice is not limited to motor skills. A master chess player does 
not see the same board as the novice, and visualizing the tower in an array of blocks would also 
become virtually effortless with prolonged practice”. 
As we have noted, the term “module” in cognitive psychology has two different meanings. 
According to Richard Samuels, 
“Until recently, even staunch proponents of modularity typically restricted themselves to the claim 
that the mind is modular at its periphery. So, for example, although the discussion of modularity as 
it is currently framed in cognitive science derives largely from Jerry Fodor's arguments in The 
Modularity of Mind, Fodor insists that much of our cognition is subserved by non modular systems. 
According to Fodor, only input systems (those responsible for perception and language processing) 
and output systems (those responsible for action) are plausible candidates for modularity. By 
contrast, 'central systems' (those systems responsible for 'higher' cognitive processes such as 
reasoning, problem-solving and belief-fixation) are likely to be non modular”.  
In contrast with this view, evolutionary psychologists reject the claim that the mind is only 
peripherally modular, in favor of the Massive Modularity Hypothesis, which proposes that the 
human mind is largely or even entirely composed of Darwinian modules. On this line Tooby and 
Cosmides (1995) claim that “On this [the modular] view, our cognitive architecture resembles a 
confederation of hundreds or thousands of functionally dedicated computers (often called modules) 
designed to solve adaptive problems (Tooby and Cosmides, 1995, p. xiii). [….] Each of these 
devices has its own agenda and imposes its own exotic organization on different fragments of the 
world. There are specialized systems for grammar induction, for face recognition, for dead 
reckoning, for construing objects and for recognizing emotions from the face. There are 
mechanisms to detect animacy, eye direction, and cheating. (ibid., p. xiv) 
The last characterization of the term “modules” is strongly controversial, and does not allow a clear 
experimental way to identify their existence and their role in the process of skill creation. On the 
contrary, in recent times experiments with neuroimaging procedures seems to confirm the 
emergence of modules – intended as specialized cognitive capabilities emerged from experience: 
 
“In a process that is not well understood, the brain figures out how to do the tasks it is assigned 
efficiently, using the specialized systems it has at its disposal. When the brain is confronted with a 
new problem it initially draws heavily on diverse regions, including, often, the prefrontal cortex 
(where controlled processes are concentrated). But over time, activity becomes more streamlined, 
concentrating in regions that specialized in processing relevant to the task. In one study (Richard 
Haier et al. 1992), subjects' brains were imaged at different points in time as they gained experience 
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with the computer game Tetris, which requires rapid hand-eye coordination and spatial reasoning. 
When subjects began playing, they were highly aroused and many parts of the brain were active 
(Figure 3, left panel). However, as they got better at the game, overall blood flow to the brain 
decreased markedly, and activity became localized in only a few brain regions (Figure 4, right 
panel). […..] the brain seems to gradually shift processing toward brain regions and specialized 
systems that can solve problems automatically and efficiently with low effort. (Camerer, 
Loewenstein, Prelec, 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 
 
 
 
This experiment confirms the emergence of stable modularized skills that are domain specific and 
automatically triggered, while evidently their persistence cannot be attributed to some innate or 
genetic property, as claimed by evolutionary psychologists.  
 
 
 
7 Domain specific versus domain general mental competences 
 
That a cognitive structure is domain-specific means that it is dedicated to solving a class of 
problems in a restricted domain. For instance, the simple algorithm learnt by individuals exposed to 
Luchins’ experiment, once memorized and automatized, is a domain specific competence; the same 
happens for chess players, who react in a specific way to given chessboards. By contrast, a 
cognitive structure that is domain-general is one that can be brought into play in a wide range of 
different domains. The traditional approach to rationality implicitly assumes that people have 
general cognitive capabilities that can be applied to any type of problem, and hence that they will 
perform equivalently on problems that have similar structure. On the contrary, the dual model 
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approach predicts that performances will be strongly dependent upon the matching between the 
given problem and the capabilities acquired by previous experience.  
As a side effect, if the dual model approach predictions are correct, acquired (routinized) 
capabilities may interfere with each other and more crucially, may interfere with System 2 
(intuition) general capabilities. One of the most investigated reasoning problems in the literature in 
which the dual model’s prediction have been tested, is the Wason selection task. While it is known 
to be very difficult in its conceptual version, if represented in a different, “deontic”, version is it is 
quite easy and – interestingly - may lead either to the right or the wrong response depending on the 
form in which is presented.  
Wason’s “four-card selection task” (1966) may be described in this way: subjects are presented with 
four cards lying on a table; they know that these cards have been taken from a pack in which each 
card has a letter on one side and a number on the other. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
They are given the following conditional rule: 
 
“If a card has an A on one side, then it has a 2 on the other side” 
 
 Subjects are requested to say which card(s) have to be turned to check if the proposed rule is right. 
The majority of respondents propose either to turn only A or to turn A and 2 ; very few of them 
(less than 10%) suggest the right solution, that is to turn A and 3.6 
Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi and Legrenzi (1972) provided a series of examples of the fact that when 
the rule expresses a duty or a right resulting from social arrangements, the number of subjects that 
correctly selecting the right cards increases.  
In the version proposed by Griggs and Cox later (1982) the number of correct answers increased 
dramatically: around 75% of the subjects responded successfully to a version of the Wason 
selection task described in the following way:  
“Imagine that you are a police officer on duty. It is your job to ensure that people conform with 
certain rules. The cards in front of you have information about four people sitting at a table. On one 
side of a card is a person's age and on the other side of the card is what a person is drinking. Here is 
a rule: 
 
 if a person is drinking beer, then the person must be over 19 years of age.  
 
Select the card, or cards that you definitely need to turn over to determine whether or not people are 
violating the rule. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The evidence from the Wason experiment shows that individuals do not search for the cards that might falsify the 
propounded rule, they suggest to turning the cards that can verify the rule. The majority of individuals, by suggesting 
turning A and 2, follow a verification principle, and are not stimulated to elicit the falsification principle.   
 
A 
 
B 
 
 
2 
 
3 
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This version of the task is a transformation of the original one, but is represented in “deontic form” 
i.e. as prescriptions related to a norm (in this case a social norm).  
Two elements have been invoked to explain the success of Cox and Griggs’ version of selection 
task: the “familiarity” and the “deontic” character. As Sperber, Cara and Girotto (1995) note, 
initially it was hypothesized that versions with concrete, familiar content, close to people's 
experience, would "facilitate" reasoning and elicit correct performance. This hypothesis proved 
wrong, however, when versions that were familiar and concrete but non-deontic failed to elicit the 
expected good performance (Manktelow & Evans, 1979) and when, on the contrary, abstract 
deontic rules (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, 1989) or unfamiliar ones (Cosmides, 1989; Girotto, Gilly, 
Blaye & Light, 1989) were successful. 
The deontic format seemed therefore to be the key to explaining successful performance, as capable 
of eliciting the right reaction: Leda Cosmides (1989) argued that this deontic representation elicits a 
domain-specific human capacity, the ability to detect cheaters; if applied to the Cox and Griggs 
version of the selection task, this capacity leads to an “automatic” selection of the right cards; in this 
particular version, in fact, subjects searching for cheater turn the cards that should cover up a 
violation of the rule, i.e. “drinking beer” and “16 years old”. 
Cosmides suggested an evolutionary explanation of the cheating detection mechanism: she argued 
that, for cooperation to have stabilized during human evolution, humans must have developed 
reciprocal altruism and – at the same time - domain-specific cognitive capacities that allowed them 
to detect cheaters. She argued that the cognitive capacities in question consisted of a social contract 
module allowing people to detect those not respecting the terms of the contract. Moreover she 
argued that not all deontic rules elicit correct selections, but only those which are processed by 
means of underlying evolved modules such as the social contract algorithm.7 
Along this line, considering both content and the context of the problem as essential, the 
“perspective effect” introduced by Gigerenzer and Hug presents a deontic version that elicits the 
cheating detection “module” within an employer-employee contractual relation and explores the 
effects of changing the role of the subjects involved in the contract. 
Gigerenzer’s thesis is that a "cheating detection mechanism" guides reasoning in the following type 
of selection task:  If the conditional statement is coded as a social contract, and the subject is cued 
into the perspective of one party in the contract, then attention is directed to information that can 
reveal that party being cheated. (Gigerenzer and Hug 1992). This thesis can be proved or falsified 
by comparing two different versions of the selection task by changing the subject that can be 
cheated in the contractual relation. 
The “perspective effect” version of the Wason selection task presents the following basic 
instructions: 
 
                                                 
7 Of course in this context modules are intended as genetically innate elements, contrary to the definition we assumed in 
the context of Luchins experiment . 
 
Drinking 
Beer 
 
Drinking 
Coke 
 
 
16 Years 
Old 
 
22 Years 
Old 
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“The cards below have information about four employees. Each card represents one person. One 
side of the card tells whether the person worked on the weekend, and the other side tells whether the 
person got a day off during the week. 
Given the following rule: “If an employee works on the week-end, than that person gets a day off 
during the week” indicate only the card(s) you definitely need to turn over to see if the rule has been 
violated.” 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition to the basic instructions, two context stories were used. One of them cued the subjects 
into the employee’s perspective, the other into the employer’s.  
 
First perspective: the subject  identifies himself as an employee 
 
The employee version stated that working on the weekend is a benefit for the employer, because the 
firm can make use of its machines and be more flexible. Working on the weekend, on the other 
hand, is a cost for the employee. The context story was about an employee who had never worked 
on the weekend before, but who is considering working on Saturdays from time to time, since 
having a day off during the week is a benefit that outweighs the costs of working on Saturday.  
 
“There are rumors that the rule has been violated before. The subjects’ task was to check 
information about four colleagues to see whether the rule has been violated before.”  
 
According to the cheating detection mechanism, the cards that have to be turned to detect if the 
employer did not respected the rule are “worked on the weekend” and “did not get a day off”. These 
are also the cards that have to be turned in a correct logical reasoning. Gigerenzer and Hug report 
that typically 75% of subjects chose the right cards. 
 They then switched the perspective from employee to employer but held everything else constant. 
 
Second perspective: the subject  identifies himself as the employer 
 
 For the employer, being cheated meant that the employee "did not work on the weekend and did 
get a day off" that is, from this perspective, subjects should select cards that are not the right ones in 
a logical reasoning.  
As the two authors report, “The results showed that when the perspective was changed, the cards 
selected also changed in the predicted direction. The effects were strong and robust across 
problems.” In the employee perspective of the day-off problem, 75% of the subjects selected 
"worked on the weekend" and "did not get a day off," but only 2 % selected the other pair of cards. 
In the employer perspective, this 2% (who selected "did not work on the weekend" and "did get a 
day off") rose to 61%. 
Therefore, the experiment shows a clear and strong impact of the representation of the problem and 
particularly the effect of the semantic content on the process of reasoning. Cosmides ascribes the 
domain-specific ability of detecting cheaters to an innate, genetically developed “cognitive 
module”; in her view, cooperation would not work without a module for directing an individual’s 
 
Worked 
on the 
weekend 
 
Did get a 
day off 
 
Did not 
work on 
the 
weekend 
 
Did not 
get a day 
off 
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attention to information that could reveal that it (or its group) is being cheated. Whether this 
happens automatically through some module specifically designed for social contracts, as claimed 
by Gigerenzer and Hug (1992) or as interaction between domain-specific skills and the domain-
general reasoning process, as dual account process suggests, is debatable. According to Sperber, 
Cara and Girotto (1995) we do not consider convincing the assumption of the Massive Modularity 
Hypothesis (the idea that the mind is a bunch of domain-specific Darwinian modules) held by 
evolutionary psychologists (Tooby and Cosmides). Sperber et al. have offered a different 
interpretation of the context sensitivity of the Wason selection task. By introducing the Relevance 
Theory, they suggest that individuals infer from the selection task rule testable consequences, 
consider them in order of accessibility, and stop when the resulting interpretation of the rule meets 
their expectations of relevance. Order of accessibility of consequences and expectations of 
relevance vary with rule and context, and so, therefore, does subjects' performance.8 
 
 
This view seems coherent with Kahneman’s assumptions that automatic and controlled cognitive 
operations compete for the control of overt responses: 
“The central characteristic of agents is not that they reason poorly but that they often act intuitively. 
And the behavior of these agents is not guided by what they are able to compute, but by what they 
happen to see at a given moment.[….] Judgment heuristics, which explain many systematic errors 
in beliefs and preferences are explained [..] by a process of attribute substitution: people sometimes 
evaluate a difficult attribute by substituting a more accessible one. Variations in the ability of 
System 2 to correct or override intuitive judgments are explained by variations in the accessibility 
of the relevant rules” (Kahneman 2002). 
Therefore the dichotomy between automaticity and computability suggests that performance will 
depend critically on the interaction between domain specific and domain general reasoning: domain 
specific cognitive skills that are evoked in reasoning in relation to a particular frame or solving a 
particular problem will be considered, as in Luchins’ experiment, as basic building blocks created 
by routinizaton of a mental process. Experimental evidence shows that individuals, once they have 
memorized the basic building blocks that proved useful to solve problems in a given context, tend 
to apply them automatically to analogous conditions (Luchins, 1942, Egidi and Narduzzo,1997); the 
evidence leads us to assume that when a specialized module (intended as specialized cognitive 
capability developed from experience) exists and is applied to a particular task, processing is rapid 
and the task goal seems to be almost effortlessly achievable.  
At the same time, however, the use of automatic modules in contexts that are slightly different from 
the original ones – as in Luchins’ experiments - may explain why automaticity can easily lead to 
errors in judgment, reasoning and problem solving. In fact, errors may be generated at two different 
levels: on the one hand, errors may be related to the use of “wrong” modules, that is modules which 
do not perfectly fit the context; more importantly, when new modules are going to be created, errors 
may be generated by the representation and decomposition of the problem. 
 
The relevance of erroneous representations emerges clearly in problem solving contexts: problem-
solving generally implies the decomposition of problems into parts to be solved separately. The 
decomposition process is susceptible to being repeatedly applied until elementary and easy sub-
problems are identified, and elementary modules are created and memorized. Some progress in 
understanding the properties of decomposition has been achieved in the recent years, after the 
original works of Simon et al. (1961), mainly with the support of applications to games and puzzles: 
the Hanoi tower and Rubik cube are typical contexts in which decomposition has been analyzed in 
depth to discover solution strategies.  
                                                 
8 Intuition of relevance is activated by a pragmatic mechanism involved in comprehending the task; people trust these 
intuitions and select cards accordingly. 
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However, it has been shown (Egidi, 2006) that when a problem is decomposed into elementary 
parts and the solutions are discovered and memorized into elementary modules, errors that players – 
whether consciously or not – make have two sources: the architecture of the decomposition and the 
transfer of modules beyond their domain of applicability. The first happens as a consequence of a 
general property of decomposition, related to Bellman principle: when we decompose a problem, 
although we discover and apply the optimal solution to each sub-problem, we generally get a sub-
optimal solution to the global problem. The conditions for optimal decomposition are quite 
restrictive and generally do not emerge in the course of the natural human process of problem 
solving; roughly speaking, this happens because individuals, searching for a decomposition pattern, 
make use of prior modules, that have been discovered and memorized in different contexts. This 
means that categorizations and classifications which have been used to solve one problem are 
extended beyond the original domain and applied to areas where can turn out to be inappropriate. 
Consequently, the errors in the mental representation of a problem can be the natural effect of the 
categorization and identification of building blocks (modules) beyond their “right” domain. This 
inappropriate extrapolation can be viewed in the “mechanization of thought” process shown by the 
Luchins and Luchins (1950) experiments. Hence, an important source of biases in decision making 
originates from the representation of the problem through decomposition.  
 
 
 
8  Concluding remarks 
 
 
While many writers have emphasized the impact of emotions in “disturbing” reasoning, we have 
paid more attention to the “illusions”, that is, according to Laplace, to the erroneous representations 
of problems that automatically come to the mind of individuals and elicit erroneous decisions. 
According to Kahneman, the term “intuition” has been used here to describe the process of 
automatic mental editing that characterizes a large part of human reasoning; the dualism between 
reasoning and intuition has therefore been considered as the source of misrepresentations and biases 
in decision and reasoning.   
The dual model we have been discussing so far is a new and promising attempt to explain the origin 
of biases. While some aspects of the dual approach have been clarified by neurophysiology - 
particularly by using brain imaging techniques - traditional psychological experiments have 
provided the greater quantity of significant evidence; although early results seem to be encouraging, 
neuropsychological studies on reasoning are still in their infancy and substantial research effort is 
needed to develop a better understanding of the neurological basis of reasoning. Of course, many 
aspects of the thinking process are still unexplored or escape our present understanding; in 
particular, the relationship between automatic mental activities and conscious calculation is more 
complex than it was emphasized in recent literature: many experiments show that the relation is not 
limited to the control of the deliberate over the automatic system and, therefore, to a “correction” of 
errors: as Simon’s experiments in chess show, chess masters’ performance depends crucially upon 
the memorized boards and correlated automatic skills (modules): the master deliberately uses the 
modules combining them to build up his strategy; as a consequence, if any of the modules does not 
perfectly fit to the solution, the strategy will deviate from the (theoretical) optimum. Moreover, 
even if all modules fit, their combination may lead to errors as a consequence of a wrong 
representation of the problem; errors are therefore nested in the reasoning process because 
automatic modules are the elementary “words” of the process: unconscious automatic processes and 
deliberate calculation are inextricably connected in complex reasoning. As a consequence, errors 
and erroneous frames may persist with remarkable stability even when they have been falsified.  
This leads us to a consideration of rationality which differs from the one traditionally assumed 
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(optimizing capacity) while converging with Popper and Hayek’s views: in our discussion, in fact, 
rationality can be essentially considered as the capacity to get rid of our errors.  
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APPENDIX  
 
 
The rediscovery of Aristotle’s thought in the XII century not only provided a fundamental technique 
for solving juridical disputations. A second, not less important consequence of the rebirth of 
Aristotle’s logic and epistemology was the rise of a philosophical program intended to “logically 
calculate” the truth of a statement from shared premises, and therefore to provide stable and 
undisputable foundations to many domains of human knowledge. The most striking effect of this 
program was the attempt to define the foundations of Christian theology through an axiomatic 
approach. Guillaume d'Auxerre, with his Summa de officiis ecclesiasticis, initiated some ideas along 
this line but, as everybody knows, this view owes its full development to Thomas Aquinas who, 
mainly in his Summa Theologiae (1273), built the pillars of a theory of a “rational theology”. 
An unpleasant consequence of providing a logically coherent - and therefore undisputable - base to 
theology was to classify as heretical a large number of otherwise questionable philosophical and 
theological propositions. This may help understand the atmosphere of passions and antagonisms in 
which the theory of fallacies grew up, sometimes leading to regrettable facts: the opposition to the 
study of fallacies, passionately upheld by Pierre de la Ramée (Ramus) around 1540, ruined him, as 
it is shown in the following biographical note.  
 
From CERPHI  Centre d’études en rhétorique, philosophie  et histoire des idées 
 
Pierre La Ramée, dit Ramus  
Notice biographique  
 
 
 Pierre De La Ramée dit Ramus (1515-1572): Né dans le Vermandois, d'une famille très modeste. Il 
monte à Paris à douze ans pour suivre les cours du collège de Navarre en devenant le domestique 
d'un riche écolier : il sert son maître le jour et étudie la nuit. À vingt et un ans, il devient maître ès 
arts en soutenant une thèse anti-aristotélicienne. Il débute au collège du Mans, puis, avec Omer 
Talon et Barthélemy Alexandre, il ouvre des cours publics où on lit des auteurs grecs et latins, où 
l'éloquence n'est pas séparée de la philosophie ; la foule y accourt. Ramus entreprend alors une 
révision critique de toutes ses études, en commençant par la logique. Son anti-aristotélisme prend 
une forme aiguë dans ses Dialecticae partitiones de 1543 et ses Aristotelicae animadversiones, qui 
lui valent les attaques de Joachim Périon et d'Antoine de Govea. Censurés par la faculté de 
théologie, ses ouvrages sont condamnés par un édit royal du 1er mars 1544. 
L'enseignement de la philosophie lui est même interdit, mais, protégé par le Cardinal de Lorraine, il 
est nommé en 1545 principal du collège de Presle. Malgré les attaques du recteur Charpentier, 
Ramus est nommé en août 1551 lecteur au Collège royal. Il consacre les huit premières années de 
son enseignement à la grammaire, la rhétorique et la logique, puis passe aux mathématiques. Il se 
convertit alors au protestantisme. Les guerres de religion l'obligent à fuir. À la paix d'Amboise 
(1563), il reprend possession de sa chaire, continue son enseignement des mathématiques et fait un 
cours sur la physique et la métaphysique d'Aristote. Il refuse une chaire à Bologne, continue à 
batailler contre Charpentier. Après avoir à nouveau dû fuir pendant la seconde guerre civile, il 
rentre à Paris en 1568. Mais sa situation n'est plus sûre. Il demande un congé pour visiter les 
principales universités d'Europe, où il est accueilli avec honneur. La religion est devenue sa grande 
préoccupation. Rappelé une troisième fois à Paris après le traité de Saint-Germain (1570), 
l'Université l'empêche d'enseigner en raison de son appartenance calviniste ; il souhaite gagner 
Genève, mais Bèze l'éconduit. Deux jours après la Saint-Barthélemy, il est assassiné par des 
égorgeurs à gage ; son corps est traîné dans les rues de Paris et jeté à la Seine. 
( http://www.cerphi.net/biblio/ramus.htm)  
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